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Labor Supply and Child Care Costs: The Effect of Rationing
∗
 
In Italy the participation of women has not increased very much in the last few decades 
relative to other developed countries and it is still among the lowest in Europe. The female 
employment rate stands almost 13 percentage points below the EU average and 22 below 
the Lisbon target. One of the most important reasons is related to the characteristics of child 
care system. In this paper we analyze the characteristics of the child care system in Italy and 
its relationship to the labor market participation decision of mothers. We present a simple 
discrete choice framework in which the two decisions can be jointly considered, which also 
allows for simple forms of rationing and estimate a bivariate probit model of the child care 
and employment decisions and interpret the results within the framework of our model. We 
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IZA (Bonn). 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the most signiﬁcant long term trends in the labor market in most
OECD countries has been the increase in the proportion of working mothers.
This is due both to the fact that a growing proportion of households with
both parents present have become dual earner families, and as a result in
the increase in the employment rate in the population of lone parent house-
holds. As a consequence of these changes parents have come to increasingly
rely upon individuals and institutions outside of the immediate household
for assistance in the child-rearing task. Because of this, the relationship
between institutionalized child-care and child outcomes and the availability
and aﬀordability of child care and labor market participation decisions has
been receiving increasing attention among researchers and policy-makers. As
entering the labour market is strongly related with the participation in the
child care market, we expect women’s entry decision to depend partly on the
cost of child care.
The increase in the incidence of non-parental child care has been object
of study since the mid-1970s in the United States, United Kingdom, and
Northern Europe, though not in Italy where it only recently has begun to
receive attention. One reason is related to Italian employment trends. In
Italy a much smaller proportion of married women are formally employed
relative to the proportions observed in most other European countries (Boeri,
Del Boca and Pissarides 2005)
A second reason is the serious data limitations that Italian researchers
face. The ISTAT Multiscopo survey contains a great deal of information
regarding the household’s use of child care but does not provide data on
family income, wages, etc. The ECHP (European Community Household
Panel), which has the advantage of being comparable with that collected in
several other European countries, contains only a very limited amount of
information on child care. The Bank o fI t a l yS u r v e yo fH o u s e h o l dI n c o m e
and Wealth (SHIW), which is the most complete micro-survey on the income
and wealth of Italian households, does not collect information on child care
on a regular basis. In order to overcome these limits, we combine two datasets
(ISTAT Multiscopo and SHIW 1998), by imputing the income variables of
individuals taken from the SHIW to identical individuals from the Multiscopo
survey using a statistical matching method (Del Boca, Locatelli, Vuri 2005).
The objective of the analysis in this paper, which is both descriptive and
3analytic, is to study the eﬀect of child care cost on labor market participa-
tion decisions. From a theoretical point of view, the impact of child care
costs on labour supply is well determined: since child care costs increase the
mother’s reservation wage, high child care costs may lead to a lower labor
force participation of women with children, especially if young. This result
has been found in a large number of empirical studies for the US, the UK and
Canada. However, what makes this task particularly diﬃcult is the fact that
child care is a good with several characteristics (e.g., quality, availability,
cost, convenience). We will ignore the variability in this good along most of
these dimensions, and instead choose to focus on the choice between formal
child care and no use of child care and employment decisions. In particular,
this paper explicitly considers the role child care costs play in the decision
o fw o m e nw i t hy o u n gc h i l d r e nt op a r t i c i p a t ei nt h el a b o rm a r k e ta n dt o
purchase child care services.
While each type of child care is characterized by a price to a particular
household,1 it is also characterized by hours of availability and other factors
related to accessibility. This diﬀerentiation is likely to be especially great in
Italy. For example, in Southern areas of the country the number of places in
public child care is extremely limited.
We analyze how the costs of child care, in addition to the problem of
gaining access to a public sector slot, distorts the labor market decision of
mothers of young children. In the presence of rationing, while the published
price of public child care may be relativ e l yl o wi nc o m p a r i s o nt ot h ep r i c eo f
private child care, its eﬀective price is inﬁnite to those families that cannot
gain access to the system.
Our main focus will be on the “mismatch” between the characteristics of
the Italian child care system and the demands of formal employment in the
Italian labor market. While Italian public sector child care oﬀers very limited
hours of operation, consist with what might be attractive to nonworking
mothers or those employed at ﬂexible, part-time jobs, such jobs are not to
be found in the formal sector of the economy. Concerning private market
child care, even if all the children can gain access to it, private services are
even less widespread than the public ones and their costs are relatively much
higher. Therefore they cannot be considered as substitute in the child care
1These prices may vary, especially in the public sector, by demographic characteristics
and the ﬁnancial resources of the household.
4market (Del Boca Locatelli and Vuri 2005).
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we provide a brief
overview of previous research on this subject. In Section 3 we consider how
preferences and rationing constraints jointly determine observed household
choices, which is particularly relevant in the child care choice context. Section
4 contains a description of the child care system as it currently exists in Italy.
This knowledge will be important for understanding the motivation behind
the behavioral model developed in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss the
data used in our (preliminary) empirical analysis, and Section 7 contains a
discussion of results. Section 8 oﬀers a provisional conclusion.
2 Previous Research
A number of researchers have attempted to estimate the behavioral eﬀects of
changes in income, wage rates, and the price of child care on various family
decisions. Research on the relationship between child care and labor market
participation in the U.S and the U.K. has mainly focused on the eﬀect of
child care costs on employment decisions (Heckman 1974, Blau and Robins
1988, Connelly 1992, Ribar 1995, Averett et al 1997, Powell 1997, Viitanen
2004, among others). These studies have used a variety of methodologies
to estimate these impacts taking into account the potential endogeneity of
observed costs due to the heterogeneity in this good (particularly along the
quality dimension).
In one of the ﬁrst examinations of this topic, Heckman (1974) estimates
a child care price function which incorporates measures of the availability of
child care and its costs; he pursues this strategy because he does not have
cost data directly available. Blau and Robins (1988) include a regional av-
erage of day care expenditure as a proxy for price, but did not control for
household-speciﬁc information such as the age of the youngest child. Con-
nelly (1992) uses predicted expenditures as an instrument for child care costs
in an accompanying labor force participation equation; the cost instrument
controlled for regional variation and family characteristics. Ribar (1992), us-
ing a more structural approach, considers expenditures per hour of care per
child as a measure of child care costs.
Generally these studies have found that family behavior is signiﬁcantly
inﬂuenced by child care policies. Blau and Robins (1988) estimate child care
5price elasticities for married women of -.38 with respect to labor supply and
-.34 with respect to the demand of formal child care. These estimates implied
that if the child care prices were zero, 87 percent of mothers would work in
contrast with a value of 58.8 actually working. In performing this policy
experiment, Blau and Robins compute the response at the characteristics of
the average woman in the sample. In contrast, Connelly (1992) evaluate the
impact of such a policy on the labor market decisions of each woman in the
sample. She ﬁnds a less substantial labor supply eﬀect: if universal no cost
child care were available, the model predicts that 68.7 per cent of women
would be employed. A similar result was obtained for the UK (Viitanen
2004). The results of all these studies show that child care costs are a very
signiﬁcant determinant of the demand for these services and employment
decisions, which are of course very highly associated themselves, ranging
from -0.02 (Ribar 1995) to a low of -0.82 (Averett et al 1997).2
Other studies focusing on other countries ﬁnd quite diﬀerent results.
Cobb-Clark et al. (2000) ﬁnd that child care costs in Australia are not
an important barrier to labor market participation, but aﬀect signiﬁcantly
t h ec h o i c eo fc h i l dc a r e . Aq u i t ed i ﬀerent picture emerges from empirical
research using data from Northern European countries. Gustaﬀson and
Staﬀord (1992) investigate the responsiveness of the decision of women to
work and use public child care in response to variation in child care fees,
availability of places, and spouse’s income in Sweden.3 They found that
in regions in which child care places do not appear to be rationed, higher
fees signiﬁcantly lowered the probability of mothers’ market work and public
child care choice, while in areas where rationing is more severe there is little
evidence of signiﬁcant price eﬀects. Kornstad and Thoresen (2003) examine
t h ec a s eo fN o r w a ya n da n a l y z eam o d e lt os i m u l a t et h ef e m a l el a b o rs u p -
ply eﬀects of the Norwegian home care allowance reform taking into account
rationing.
Studies analyzing Continental and Mediterranean Europe use a similar
approach. Del Boca (1993) estimates a model similar to that of Blau and
2Some of these studies have also compared the employment responsiveness to child care
costs for married mothers and single mothers.The results for single mothers are much less
robust (Kimmel 1998, Jenkins and Symons 1995, among others).
3Sweden is widely held to have the highest quality child care among the countries of
the region, and also oﬀers the greatest degree of availability. The participation rate of
Swedish mothers is also the highest in the region.
6Robins (1988) to determine the eﬀect of child care costs on the participation
decisions of married women allowing for the choice between part-time and
full-time work and between public and private child care systems. The esti-
mation of the relationship between child care costs and labor supply shows
that a reduction in child care costs increases the probability of mothers’ part-
time employment but has a less signiﬁcant eﬀect on the probability of working
full time. These results raise some concerns given that part-time employment
opportunities are in such a short supply in the Italian labor market.4 Using
the Bank of Italy data, Chiuri (2000) does not ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀect of child
care costs.
Kreynfeld and Hank (2003) do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of child care
costs on the participation decision of mothers in Germany, explaining this
result with the peculiar child care situation in Germany, where opening hours
of child care facilities are not long and ﬂexible enough to meet the demands
of working mothers. Availability appears to be more important than costs.
Wrohlich (2004) compares west and east Germany and reports signiﬁcant
but very small eﬀects of child care costs on mother’s labor supply.
Table 1 reports and summarizes the signs and the signiﬁcance of the
coeﬃcients associated with child care costs and availability on labor market
participation. The varying estimates certainly reﬂect diﬀerences in important
institutional characteristics of the countries. In countries like US, Canada,
UK, Australia where the child care services are provided at private level, the
focus is on the costs and quality of the services, while in countries where
the provision is mostly public (Sweden, Norway, Germany, Italy) availability
seems to be as important as costs.
In this paper we focus on Italy which shares with some other European
countries the characteristics of the so-called ”Southern model”: the lowest
level of social protection (especially social expenditures for families and chil-
dren) and the strictest employment regulations, which together require the
family to provide essential “social” services (Ferrera, 1996). Gornick, Meyers
and Ross (1997) have used the Luxembourg Income Study to analyze the
eﬀect of various policies that support employment for mothers of young chil-
4Empirical studies employing cross-country data have found a high correlation between
the proportion of part time jobs and the participation rates of women, in particular married
women with children (Meulders and Plasman 1994). The low proportion of part-time
workers seems mainly to be induced by characteristics of the demand side of the labor
market.
7dren. While Italy is ranked quite high for policies for mothers with children
between 3-6, it is ranked quite low for policies for mothers with children
under three. Bradshaw et al (1997) rank several countries (using a index
ranging from 1 to 17) for the income support provided to families with chil-
dren. Italy is ranked 10.3, Spain 12.8 and Greece 14.3, while Denmark is
ranked 7.0, France is ranked 3.7, and Sweden earns a 5.3.
Given the extremely low level of family beneﬁts, the family still acts as
the explicit partner of the execution of social policies. In such a system, the
family is forced to act as a buﬀer providing monetary and time transfers to
its members to shield them from some of the harmful byproducts of rigid
labor markets and limited income maintenance schemes.
Recent analyses have deﬁned the Southern Model as the ”family care
model” and have tried to discuss the implications (relative to other possi-
ble social welfare state constructions) for the welfare of women and children
(Antonnen and Sipilla 1996). In general, empirical analyses have indicated
that the family and social policies of the Mediterranean countries have con-
tributed to the worsening position of women and children (Esping Andersen
1999). Interventions producing reductions in the costs of children should be
a focus for reducing the burden on the family. Ferrera (1996) and Addabbo
(2001) analyze the positive experience in family-welfare mix of Emilia Ro-
magna where expanded child care with longer hours have contributed to
encourage women to work. It is reasonable to assume that similar types of
interventions in other regions of Italy, particularly the South, could have very
positive impacts on labor supply.
3 Labor Supply Decisions and Characteris-
tics of Child Care Services
The analysis of the impact of child care policy on labor supply necessitates
consideration of at least two dimensions of services: availability and costs.5
In this section we will discuss some issues of measurement as well as the
relationship between costs and availability. In terms of the monetary cost
5Of course child care quality is an exceedingly important dimension as well. We largely
neglect it here due to the absence of any information on the characteristics of child care
services used in the data.
8of “formal” child care, they are typically signiﬁcant. Estimates place child
care expenses at from 30 to 50 per cent of the earnings of employed mothers
with one child under the age of three. The analysis of availability focuses on
the family’s ability to ﬁnd “appropriate” child care given the going price of
services. It has been found that the shortage of child care options in terms
of schedules and location severely limits the use of these services.
An important component of child care costs and availability concerns the
relationship between the distances of the family’s residence, the workplaces
of the parents, and the location of the facilities. In a sense, availability of
child care slots can only be deﬁned with respect to a set of “acceptable” child
care facilities to the family, and distance is a prime factor in deﬁning this
choice set. Say that there are 40 child care facilities in a particular urban
area. Given the monetary cost of each, the distance of each from the family’s
residence and employment locations, and the quality of each, the family may
decide that there are 10 facilities the use of which would provide positive
surplus. Over these 10 facilities the family would have an ordering in terms
of preferences. Then we will say that the family is limited by “availability”
if there is no vacancy for their child in any of the 10 “acceptable” facilities.
While there may be vacancies in the 30 nonacceptable facilities, these will
not be used.
Note that accessibility will impact the relationship we observe between
price (and quality if we were looking at it explicitly) and the utilization of
services even for those families who utilize formal child care. Returning to
our example in the previous paragraph, say that among the 10 acceptable
child care facilities the ranking the household assigns to them is a decreasing
function of the price charged. If in this city accessibility is low, then it
is relatively likely that one of the least favorite (but acceptable) facilities
will be utilized, one with a relatively high price. However, if availability
were guaranteed at all facilities, the one with the lowest price would have
been observed. The point of this example is that availability will impact
t h ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c so fc h i l dc a r es e r v i c e sc h o s e ne v e nw h e nt h eh o u s e h o l d
uses formal child care. In some real sense, the two aspects of choice are not
independent and must be considered jointly. With better data it would be
possible to do much more along this dimension than we are able to do here.
These considerations regarding child care availability suggest that the
usual price eﬀects (considering child care services as a normal good) should
only be observed in areas in which availability constraints are not binding
9(see Gustaﬀson and Staﬀord 1992). In other areas, as our example suggests,
the relationship between price and utilization will be much “noisier.”
The issue of child care availability is especially important in countries
with low birth rates. For example, in a country like Italy where the average
number of children is close to 1 and a high proportion of children grow up
without siblings, the purpose of child care is not only supervision and care
but also represents an essential socialization opportunity. This is one reason
why women who do not work still use child care in these countries.
Child care costs impact family decision making in two ways. First, child
care costs can be thought of as a part of the cost of rearing a child and
so aﬀect decisions in which the cost of children is a relevant factor, most
importantly fertility. In addition, given the presence of a child, child care
costs lower the mother’s eﬀective wage in the labor market and thus impact
decisions for which the mother’s wage is a relevant “state variable.”
The higher the cost of child care, the higher the cost of an additional
child. This leads to the prediction that higher child care costs will tend
to decrease fertility (Cigno 1991, Del Boca 2002, Ermisch 1989). In most
families mothers are the members of the families with the lowest potential
earnings and hence are the “marginal” workers in the formal labor market.
Once the fertility decision has been made, the major impact of child care
costs is on the wage of the working mother. Given that women are the
principal caregivers in the household, the mother bases her decisions on the
costs and beneﬁts of working in the labor market and these will depend on
her wage minus the cost per hour worked of child care. Increasing the cost
of extra-family child care decreases her eﬀective wage. A decrease in her
eﬀective wage decreases the probability of participation in the labor market.
If she is still participating a decline in her eﬀective wage has two oﬀsetting
eﬀects on the number of hours she will work. A decrease in the wage lowers
the amount of family income, which has the eﬀect of increasing the number
of hours she will work in the market. But the decrease in the wage lowers the
value of an extra hour spent in the labor market relative to the value of an
extra hour spent at home. So the number of hours of work should decrease
as the cost of child care increases. The eﬀect of child care costs will be larger
on women’s participation because they may not be able to adjust their hours
in the labor market to exactly equal their preferred number of hours of work.
104 The Child Care System in Italy
In Anglo-Saxon countries, where private provision and ﬁnancing of child
care prevails, the costs of child care are an important variable aﬀecting the
labor market participation decisions of women. In Italy (as well as in other
countries predominately found in Europe), where there is a mixture of private
and public-funded child care, the direct costs do not seem to be as signiﬁcant
of a determinant of usage and labor market participation of mothers. In
the U.S. and U.K. there is a very diverse set of child care arrangements,
in terms of type and costs, from which to choose. This diversity, which
oﬀers a wider range of choices to parents, creates diﬃculties for the study
of price responsiveness because of product heterogeneity and unmeasured
quality diﬀerences in this market. In Italy, as in other European countries
(such as Sweden), formal child care is judged to be of high quality and quality
levels are set by the federal government so that the problem of unmeasured
quality diﬀerences in the child care market is of less concern. Finally while
for market economies the problem of availability/accessibility is related to
the ability/inability to pay the marketp r i c ef o rt h eq u a l i t yo fc h i l dc a r e
parents want, in economies where public provision prevails the problem of
availability is a result of inherent shortage of child care slots.
In Italy the price of public child care is very heterogenous across areas.
The amount parents pay diﬀers from one municipality to another because
the structure of the subsidy and the number of spaces is set by the local
government. Unlike private child care, the costs of public child care depend
on family size, family income, and family composition. The cost of public
child care is lower for larger families in all areas.
Important diﬀerences characterize public child care for children younger
than 3 and for those 3 or older. First of all, the costs of child care for children
less than 3 years of age are much higher on average than are the costs of child
care for children 3 or older, both in public and private child care services and
for either part-time or full-time services.
Other diﬀerences concern the availability of public care. While public
child care for children 3 or older has an utilization rate of 95 percent, child
care for children younger than 3 is used only by 6 per cent of the population
of children (OECD Employment Outlook, 2001). Because of this we focus
mainly on child care for children less than 3 years of age, which is crucial if
mothers of young children are to participate in the labor market.
11The child care system for younger children is rationed in two ways. On
one hand, the number of places available in the public sector are extremely
limited. Moreover, the hours of public child care availability are rigidly set
and have a limit of 7 hours a day. The child care for children 3-5 is rationed
only in terms of the number of hours available.
Given this characteristic of the public child care system, it is not possible
to accommodate full-time work schedules of both parents with the exclusive
use of public child care.6 This rigidity in hours of service has negatively
aﬀected the growth in labor market participation of mothers with young
children. The rate of growth in this statistic has been much lower over the
past few decades in Italy than in other developed market economies. This
situation is similar to the German institutional characteristics, in particular
the combination of limited availability of child care facilities and the low
price of child care.
While the availability of child care for children three and older is very
u n i f o r ma c r o s sr e g i o n s ,t h i si sn o tt h ec ase for children under three. There are
marked diﬀerences across regions. The proportion of children less than three
years of age in public child care is around 15-20 percent in some areas of the
North and only 1-2 percent in most Southern areas (this ratio is the number of
places available divided by the population 0-3 years of age, Fondazione degli
Innocenti 2002). Not coincidently, in the Northern areas the labor market
participation rate of mothers is greater than 60 percent while in the Southern
r e g i o n si ti sl e s st h a n2 0p e r c e n t .
Diﬀerent accessibility rates have created a situation of more severe ra-
tioning of public child care in some areas of the country, especially in the
South of Italy. In these areas women ﬁnd it diﬃcult to ﬁnd a job in the
formal labor market and are unemployed or work in the underground econ-
omy. Child care for young children is therefore rationed in two ways: (1)
in the number of places available (ﬁfty per cent of children on average are
not accepted in the public care); and (2) in the hours of care oﬀered (from a
maximum of 7 on average in public child care to around 9-10 in private child
care).
Given the existence of these two types of rationing many methodological
problems arise. In order to illustrate the impact of child care characteristics
6Full-time employment typically necessitates that the employee be away from the home
for approximately 9 hours per day, ignoring commuting time.
12on women’s labor market participation, in the next section we look at a
simple model of the mother’s decision to work and use child care.
5 Formal and Informal Childcare and the Em-
ployment Decision
To keep things extremely simple, and because the vast majority of employed
mothers work at full time jobs in Italy, we will examine only the choice to
work full-time or not. We shall also simplify along the child care dimension as
well, in that we will assume that formal child care is utilized “full-time” if it
is used at all. Furthermore, we shall simply assume that informal services are
used if a woman is employed and there is a diﬀerence between the number of
hours of employment and the number of hours of formal child care provided.
If informal child care is utilized when the woman is not employed we will
miss that; in our framework, there could be a desire for such child care as
a way to increase the amount of the mother’s leisure time or because the
mother values the socialization and instruction her child(ren) receive at the
childcare facility.
In line with the preferences assumed above, let the household’s utility be
given by
U(C,L,dCC)=αlnL +( 1− α)lnC + ξdCC,
where dCC = 1 if the child is enrolled in formal child care and ξ is the
valuation of this event, which may take any value on the real line. As above,
consumption is given by
C = Y + w(T − H) − MCC,
where MCC denotes the monetary cost of childcare and H denotes the “stan-
dard” hours of work associated with full time employment. We set H =4 0 .
Assuming that full time formal child care supplies τ = 35 hours of service,
the monetary costs of childcare are given by
MCC = dCCπFτ + dE{dCCπI(H − τ)+( 1− dCC)πIH},
where πF denotes the hourly cost of formal child care, πI denotes the hourly
price in the informal sector, and dE is an indicator variable that takes the
value 1 if the mother is employed.
13As we discussed above, an important limitation of the Italian child care
system is the relatively small number of available slots. To take this into
account in a crude way necessitates that we view the availability of formal
child care as probabilistic. If we let Z denote demographic characteristics
of the household that are formal and informal determinants of the mother’s
probability of obtaining a childcare slot, then we denote the probability that
formal child care is in the choice set of the mother by δ(Z).
We can now set up the discrete choice problem that the mother faces at a
point in time. Let X denote a set of exogenous characteristics that aﬀect the
mother’s chances of obtaining a job oﬀer, and let the probability of receiving
an oﬀer be given by θ(X). Begin by assuming that she has access to a full
time job oﬀer of w and that the cost of ”informal” care for the children is
πI. If she has access to child care (so dA =1 ) , then her choices and their
associated values are as follows:
Work (dE)C C ( dCC)V a l u e
00 αln(T)+( 1− α)ln(Y )
10 αln(T − H)+( 1− α)ln(Y +( w − πI)H)
01 αln(T)+( 1− α)ln(Y − πFτ)+ξ
11 αln(T − H)+( 1− α)ln(Y + wH − πFτ − πI(H − τ)) + ξ
We can summarize the value of the various choices by the expressions
V (dE,d CC|w,Y,πI,ξ), where the other arguments (T,H,τ,πF)a r es u p r e s s e d
for simplicity and because they are assumed to be constant in the popu-
lation. We let the distribution of wage oﬀers to mothers with productivity
characteristics Q be denoted by G(w|Q) with associated (conditional) density
g(w|Q).
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hw eo b s e r v et h ew o m a na taj o ba n du s i n g
formal child care services. In this case we know that w>0, that is, she
received a positive wage oﬀer, and dA =1 , that is, she was granted access
to formal child care services. Given these conditions, we know that the
14probability that the household chooses (dE =1 ,d CC =1 )i sg i v e nb y
p(dE =1 ,d CC =1 |w,Y,πI,ξ)=
P(V (1,1|S) − V (1,0|S) > 0,V(1,1|S) − V (0,1|S) > 0,V(1,1|S) − V (0,0|S) > 0)
×θ(X) × δ(Z)
= P((1 − α)(ln(Y + wH − πFτ − πI(H − τ)) − ln(Y +( w − πI)H)) + ξ>0,
α(ln(T − H) − ln(T)) + (1 − α)(ln(Y + wH − πFτ − πI(H − τ)) − ln(Y − πFτ)) > 0,
α(ln(T − H) − ln(T)) + (1 − α)(ln(Y + wH − πFτ − πI(H − τ)) − ln(Y )) + ξ>0)
×θ(X) × δ(Z).
We note the following features of this expression. Assume that the para-
meter α is ﬁxed in the population, but that πI,w ,and ξ are random, with
each taking values on the positive real line (0,∞). Then in terms of the
diﬀerence V (1,1|w,Y,πI,ξ) − V (1,0|w,Y,πI,ξ), there are always combina-
tions of (πI,ξ)f o rw h i c ht h i sd i ﬀerence is positive. In terms of the diﬀerence
V (1,1|w,Y,πI,ξ) − V (0,1|w,Y,πI,ξ), the term ξ cancels since formal child
care is received under either alternative. For a suﬃciently high value of w
and high value of πI this expression can be positive. Finally, in terms of
V (1,1|w,Y,πI,ξ) − V (0,0|w,Y,πI,ξ), this diﬀerence can be positive given
relatively large values of w, high values of ξ, and low values of πI. Of course,
t h ef a c tt h a ta n yg i v e nd i ﬀerence can be positive for certain combinations of
(w,ξ,πI) does not mean that there exists values of these random variables
for which all inequalities are simultaneously satisﬁed. We will investigate
this issue through the use of simulation methods below.
When we observe a household in which the mother is not employed and/or
is not using formal child care services, we don’t know whether this is due
to the fact that all options are available to the household (i.e., both work
and formal child care services) and the particular outcome observed yields
the highest value in the choice set with four possibilities, or whether it is
attributable to the choice set being “restricted.” Consider the case in which
the mother is employed but does not use formal child care. By the fact that
she is employed, we know that a job was available to her. That she does not
use formal child care is due to the fact that it is available to her but its use
does not yield as high a value as does using informal care or the fact that
15she would use it if available but it is not. Then we write the probability
p(dE =1 ,d CC =0 |w,Y,πI,ξ)=
P(V (1,0|S) − V (1,1|S) > 0,V(1,0|S) − V (0,1|S) > 0,V(1,0|S) − V (0,0|S) > 0)
×θ(X) × δ(Z)
+P(V (1,0|S) − V (0,0|S) > 0) × θ(X) × (1 − δ(Z)),
where the second and third lines of the expression give the probability that
the option (1,0) is the best in the four element choice set multiplied by the
probability that the household faced that choice set and the last line is the
probability that (1,0) was superior to (0,0) times the probability that the
household faced the two element choice set containing {(1,0),(0,0)}.
The probability that the mother does not work but does utilize formal
child care is expressed in a similar manner. In this case the mother has the
option of formal child care clearly, but we do not know whether she had a
job oﬀer or not. The probability of this event is
p(dE =0 ,d CC =1 |w,Y,πI,ξ)=
P(V (0,1|S) − V (1,1|S) > 0,V(0,1|S) − V (1,0|S) > 0,V(0,1|S) − V (0,0|S) > 0)
×θ(X) × δ(Z)
+P(V (0,1|S) − V (0,0|S) > 0) × (1 − θ(X)) × δ(Z).
The situation in which the mother does not work and does not use formal
child care, which is the most frequently observed of the four outcomes in the
data, has the most complicated expression for its probability since it could
have been selected from any of four distinct choice sets. The probability is
p(dE =0 ,d CC =0 |w,Y,πI,ξ)=
P(V (0,0|S) − V (1,1|S) > 0,V(0,0|S) − V (1,0|S) > 0,V(0,0|S) − V (0,1|S) > 0)
×θ(X) × δ(Z)
+P(V (0,0|S) − V (0,1|S) > 0) × (1 − θ(X)) × δ(Z)
+P(V (0,0|S) − V (1,0|S) > 0) × θ(X) × (1 − δ(Z))
+(1 − θ(X)) × (1 − δ(Z)),
where the last line is the probability that no job or child care slot was avail-
ability - in this case, the outcome (0,0) is the default.
16As promised above, we now provide some simulation evidence regarding
the performance of this model. To keep things simple, we will assume that
the probabilities of receiving a job oﬀer, the probability of having access to
child care, and the wage oﬀer distributions are ﬁxed in the population at the
common values θ, δ, and G. We assume that G is lognormally distributed
with parameters such that the logarithm of the wage distribution has mean
1.5 and standard deviation .5. We assume that the probability of having a
child care slot available to a family, δ, is .7, and the probability of having
access to a job, θ, is .6. The preference weight given to the woman’s time
in the household, α, is set at .4. The woman is assumed to have a weekly
time endowment of T =9 0 , and other family income is set at Y =5 0 0 . If the
woman accepts employment, she must supply exactly H = 40 hours at the
job, and if her child participates in formal child care they spend τ =3 5h o u r s
a week in the program. If the mother is employed and the child participates
in formal child care, it is assumed that the child is in formal child care while
the mother is working.
The other random variables in the model in addition to the wage oﬀer
(if there is one) are the costs of informal child care, πI, and the valuation of
having the child participate in a formal child care program, ξ. We assume
that both are lognormally distributed in the population. The ln of πI has
mean -.3 and standard deviation 1. The ln of ξ has mean -2 and standard
deviation 1.
We simulated choice probabilities by drawing 200 pseudo random draws
for each of the random variables (w,πI,ξ). Using each of the 8 million com-
binations of these draws we ﬁrst computed the optimal choice assuming that
jobs and child care slots were available in all cases - that is, the full choice
set of four options was present. We then drew other pseudo random vari-
ables for each case to determine the individual’s “actual” choice set for this
combination of the draws of (w,πI,ξ). Given the outcomes of these draws
we redeﬁned the choice set and determined the best choice within it. We
then computed population averages of choices in the restricted and the un-
restricted regimes.
The proportions appear in Table 2. We look ﬁrst at the case without
rationing. We see that the probability that a family with these characteristics
would be using formal child care and have the mother at work is .45. The
probability that the mother would be employed but the child would not be in
formal child care is .07, so that the overall employment probability is about
17.52, with more than 80 percent of working mothers using formal child care.
The probability of using formal child care and not working is .18, so that the
proportion of families using formal child that have the mother employed is
.72. The proportion of families in which the mother neither works nor has a
job is .29.
The situation changes dramatically when rationing is added. The most
severely impacted choice is that involving both being employed and using
formal child care, since that is subject to rationing in both the labor market
and the formal child care sector (which for simplicity we have assumed oper-
ate independently). The probability of having both choices available is only
.42 (.6 × .7). Accordingly, we see that the probability of working and using
child care is reduced from .45 to .19.
The “double rationing” has especially interesting implications for the
choices (1,0) and (0,1). For example, for some combinations of the draws
(w,πI,ξ) the preferred choice of the household would be (1,0) when all
choices were available. When a job is not available, however, this choice
is not available and the household must make another. This lowers the likeli-
hood of observing (1,0). However, under rationing in some cases the preferred
choice would have been something other than (1,0) - like (1,1) say - would
be induced to choose (1,0) in their restricted choice set. Thus rationing can
only reduce the probability of observing (1,1), can only increase the prob-
ability of observing (0,0), but the net eﬀects on the likelihood of observing
the “mixed” cases (1,0) or (0,1) would seem to be ambiguous. In the ex-
a m p l eh e r ew es e et h a tb o t hh a v ei n c r e a sed, with the probability that the
household would have the woman working and the child not in formal child
care changing from .073 to .095. The probability of observing child care but
not employment also increases from .183 to .216.
The purpose of this section has been to outline a model that is capable of
providing a link between formal child care and employment decisions. The
model could be used to carry out policy simulations through manipulation
of some of the parameters, especially the rationing probabilities δ and θ. We
intend to pursue the estimation of this model in the future, but for now we
simply use it to motivate the more descriptive empirical analysis performed
in the following section that investigates the link between these two choices.
186 Methods and Data
The data used in this section combine information from Italian datasets,
the SHIW and the Multiscopo survey, the ﬁrst containing information on
income and earnings and the second containing information on child care
use, costs, hours of service and type of child care, i.e. formal (public and
private) and informal. In order to merge these two datasets, we employ a
statistical matching method which consists in imputing income and earnings
variables of an individual from the SHIW to an identical individual from the
Multiscopo (see Appendix 1 for the details on the matching procedure).
To be included in the sample used for estimation, households have to
contain married adults with the youngest child under three years of age.
Only 7 per cent of married couples in have the youngest child in this age
range. This small percentage is a result of the low fertility rate in Italy (see
Del Boca (2002) for an econometric analysis of the fertility decision in the
Italian context). The geographic distribution of our ﬁnal sample has 33.9
percent of households from the South, 12.8 from the Islands, 16.9 percent
from the Central section, 19.3 percent from the Northwest, and 17.0 percent
from the Northeast. In terms of labor market participation rates of the wives
and mothers, 44.1 percent of the sample works (almost twice the the national
ﬁgure).
Regarding child care utilization, we note that both formal child care
(which includes public and private child care provided by schools) and infor-
mal child care (provided by relatives or friends or baby-sitter) are reported.
However, the Multiscopo survey does not give information neither on the
costs of the informal child care nor on the number of hours used, therefore
we focus on the use of public and private services. Among families with chil-
dren less than three years of age, 20.5 percent of households use child care.
Of the working mothers, around 28 percent use formal child care, while only
14 percent of the not working mothers use formal child care.
The data on child care usage patterns of mothers by employment status
indicate that there is a nonnegligible number of women who do not work but
use child care. There is greater use of informal child care by women working
full-time than by women working part-time. This could be due to the fact
than women working full time need additional time relative to the formal
child care hours.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h eu s eo fp u b l i ca n dp r i v a t ec h i l dc a r ei sr e l a t i v e l yl o w( i n
19comparison to U.S. ﬁgures, for example) indicates the potential impact of the
constraints presented by the high degree of rationing in access to public child
care and the limited supply of both public and private child care slots. While
the situation regarding private child care has changed somewhat during the
intervening ten years, it remains true that there is an underprovision of formal
child care services in general. Column 2 of Table A.1 shows the proportion of
applications to child care which were accepted. It shows that the ”rationing”
concerns about 1/4 -1/3 of children: the proportion is higher in the southern
regions where child care availability is lower.
We use a bivariate probit model to jointly estimate the probability of
working and using child care. Given previous results (Heckman 1993) that
have shown a very low responsiveness of hours of work to all measured vari-
ables (given the prevalence of full time jobs in the labor market), we use
participation instead of hours. The dependent variables are whether the wife
is working at the time of the interview and whether or not and the household
uses formal child care.
Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation are reported
in Table 3. The variables utilized in the analysis include:
Personal Characteristics: parents’ age and schooling, family non labor
income and husband labor income.
Family Support: even if we have information on informal child care use
from relatives and friends, we prefer not to use it directly in the estimation
since it is potentially endogenous. We also use a variable indicating whether
the family has received tranfers from relatives during the year of the interview
as a proxy for family ﬁnancial support.
Child Care System: As an indicator of the characteristics of the child
care system, we use the percentage of available slots of public and private
child care across region (given 100 the total in Italy). To test for the relevance
of the rationing in child care we use as a proxy a dummy variable (NW)
indicating that the household is situated in one of the region in which the
provision of child care (both public and private) is greatest (Emilia Romagna,
Lombardia and Veneto, see Table A.1).
Child care costs: the costs paid by households using school child care
(either public or private).
Labor Market: As an indicator of the probability of locating a part-time
job, we use the ratio of the number of part-time jobs to total employment in
the region (see Table A.1), and as an indicator of availability of job in the
20region, we use the regional unemployment rate (Istat, Annuario Statistico
Italiano 1999-2000).
If we look at Table 4, where the proportions of work and use of formal
child care according to the presence of rationing (NW=1) in the area are
reported, we notice that in absence of rationing most of the women are
not using child care opportunities even if they are working. However the
situation changes when rationing is added. The proportion of working women
decreases sharply, while it increases the proportion of mothers who neither
works nor use formal child care (from 0.31 to 0.51).
7 Empirical Results
As discussed in the description of the child care system in Italy and given
the model we have constructed, we can expect that the price of child care
may not “signiﬁcantly” inﬂuence its use since for many regions there is a
severe rationing of spaces. Only for less rationed areas would a clear impact
be expected. Conditional on other household characteristics, we will assess
whether the costs of child care have a larger (negative) eﬀect on its utilizations
in regions where rationing of spaces is less severe.
One important problem that we face in estimation is the issue of the endo-
geneity of child care costs. Since we would like to consider the two equations
as constituting a (partial) demand system for the household, naturally we
would like to include the parameters that characterize the household choice
set. These include the prices of child c a r e ,b o t hp u b l i ca n dp r i v a t e ,a sw e l l
as any limitations on the uses of these services by a speciﬁc household. Since
we only have child care costs paid by the household, this is not primarily a
measure of the price but instead measures of utilization. To get around this
endogeneity problem, we estimate the hourly child care costs equation from
which to predict the child care costs potentially paid by all the households
in the sample. The child care price regression is estimated using the ap-
propriate correction for Heckman selection (see Heckman 1979). The results
from the child care price equation, corrected for sample selection, are used
to construct a predicted price of care for each mother in the sample.7 In this
7Most studies using US or Uk data employ a double selection model, since in many
datasets childcare expenditures is observed only for working mothers who report paying
for childcare. Therefore the selection arises fr o mt w os o u r c e s :t h ed e c i s i o nt op a r t i c i p a t e
21context, the child care cost equation can be estimated by OLS since all the
families who use formal child care face some costs.8
Let the child care cost equation be:
πF = α
0D + νF
where πF is observed only for those families using market child care, D is a
vector of observed determinants and νF represents unobserved variation.
It is assumed that the costs of child care will vary according to some
family characteristics. Expenditures on child care are expected to be higher
for those families with higher levels of unearned income (or receiving tranfers
from their parents) reﬂecting variations in the quality of care. The presence
of alternative caregivers in the household, as represented by having parents
still alive, is expected to aﬀect the availability of low-cost care and hence
expenditures. Wife’s and husband’s years of schooling are expected to aﬀect
positively child care expenditures, since more schooling is often associated
with higher labor earnings.9 Finally, we use regional dummies which should
capture diﬀerences in regulation and prices across regions. In order to iden-
tify the child care cost equation we use the ratio of the number of child care
places available (for children under 3 years of age) to the number of children
3 years of age or less by area of residence in 1998. From the estimation of the
child care equation, it turns out that regions in the South of Italy and Islands
have lower child care costs, while in the North East (which is the wealthiest
part of Italy) child care costs tend to be higher with respect to the Centre
and North West. Families with higher levels of unearned income pay signif-
icantly more for care, as expected. The presence of alternative caregivers,
in particular grandparents decreases child care costs while parental schooling
increases child care costs (but these eﬀects are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero). The selection term of the child care price equation, which accounts
for the possibility that those mothers who work and choose formal child care
in the labor market and the decision of using paid care. However, in Italy, the link between
the utilization of child care and employment is not very strong and therefore we employ a
single sample selection correction term, as in Ribar (1992) and Wrohlich (2004).
8Wrohlich (2004) estimates the child care equation with a Tobit model since in her
sample 10% of households using formal child care do not have to pay for it, i.e. face zero
costs and this couls lead to negative predictions if using OLS.
9Household labor income is usually one of the criteria which determines the household
child care expenditures.
22may face lower prices than the population as a whole, is negative but not
signiﬁcant. It means that the ”amount” one pays for child care among those
w h od op a yi sn o ts i g n i ﬁcantly aﬀected by selectivity into the set of child
care payers.10
Table 5 presents the estimates from a speciﬁcation in which child care
costs (as a proxy for price) enter the labor market participation and the
child care equations alone. We consider the eﬀect of child care and the
eﬀect of availability of child care conditional on several characteristcs of the
environment (the proportion of part time work, the level of unemployment,
the proportion of female employment in the public sector) and household
characteristics. The results show that the price of formal child care does not
have a signiﬁcant impact on either choices. Households living in one of the
three selected regions (i.e., NW= 1) have a higher probability of working and
using child care, but both eﬀects turn out to be not signiﬁcant.
In terms of personal characteristics, we see that more highly educated
women are more likely to work. Presumably, the main impact of higher ed-
u c a t i o ni so nt h em a r k e tw a g eo ﬀer, so this ﬁnding is consistent with a wage
eﬀect. Instead, a husband with higher education discourages the wife partic-
ipation to the labor market. Furthermore, highly educated parents are more
likely to use formal child care. This result is also consistent with the fact that
more highly-educated parents place greater value on the services provided by
regulated child care settings (the opportunity for socialization with other
children, relationship with teachers, etc.). Older mothers of young children
are more likely to work probably because they invest more in human capital
accumulation and have longer tenure if working. Higher household non labor
income and husband labor income are associated with an increased utiliza-
tion of child care, possibly arising from a higher level of demand for leisure,
free of child care burdens by mothers from wealthier households (however
the coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant even if of the expected signs).
Households in which the wife has at least one living parent have a higher
probability of work and a lower probability of using formal child care, indicat-
ing that these households may be using parents as substitutes for formal child
care. Those women receiving family transfers tend to use signiﬁcantly more
formal child care and to work less, which may indicate that such transfers
a r ep r o v i d e dt oh e l ps u b s i d i z ec h i l dc a r eu s e .
10Results are available on request from the authors.
23The presence of children 4-5 years of age increases the probability of using
formal child care (increasing the probability of being accepted in the public
child care as well as reducing several costs associated to the use of formal
child care like transportation costs and other after school arrangements). At
the same time, the presence of children younger that 13 years have a nega-
tive impact on mother’s employment because they still need maternal care.
Concerning the regional variables, the availability of part time jobs does not
have a signiﬁcant impact on both decisions. As expected, the condition of
the local labor market proxied by the regional unemployment rate negatively
inﬂuences women’s labor participation: in areas where the rate of unemploy-
m e n ti sh i g h e r ,w o m e na r el e s sl i k e l yt ow o r k .A tt h es a m et i m et h eu s eo f
formal child care is discouraged by higher unemployment rate, likely because
areas where there is lack of labor market opportunities are also characterized
by lack of services like child care.11
Finally, the coeﬃcient of correlation between the errors of the two equa-
tions is positive and strongly signiﬁcant, thus indicating the simultaneity in
the choices of female participation and use of market child care; demographic
and household characteristics, rather than child care characteristics, mainly
seem to aﬀect child care decisions.
In Table 6 we reestimate the model after including an interaction term
between regional child care cost and residence in the “high child care pro-
vision” areas (Emilia Romagna, Lombardia and Veneto). A likelihood ratio
test indicates that this model is preferred with respect to the one without
this interaction term.
Most of the coeﬃcient estimates are relatively similar across the two spec-
iﬁcations with a few notable exceptions. The child care cost variable inter-
acted with residence in the three region area has an associated coeﬃcient
on the probability of using formal child care that is negative and signiﬁcant,
whereas the “main eﬀect” of child care costs continues to be insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. This is consistent with our argument that the price mat-
ters only when rationing is not severe. Moreover, the “main eﬀect” of living
in the high availability region now becomes signﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in
both equations, showing that a higher availability of child care increases both
11We have also used in the estimation the percentage of women employed in the public
sector in each region as an indicator of the probability of being employed in the public
sector. However, it turns out to be not signiﬁcant and the results do not change if this
variable is excluded from the estimation.
24the probability of working and using child care. This could indicate that the
main reason why people living in these three regions have higher participa-
tion rates and utilization rates of child care is because supply is greater, a
conclusion quite consistent with competitive market models. Compared to
results from studies from the US, Canada or the UK, which report partici-
pation elasticities from -0.02 (Ribar 1995) to -0.8 (Averett et.al. 1997), the
price of child care elasticities of our study are located at the lower end of
the range. The relatively smaller elasticities might essentially reﬂect the fact
that, since child care facilities are more subsidized in Italy (as in Germany)
relatively to the UK. For instance, while in Germany the average hourly
child care expenses by child (in Euro) is about 0.76 euro, for Italy parents
pay about 1.45 euro per hour, while in the UK the average fees are about
0.96 pounds per hour.12 Another explanation has to do with the limitation
of hours in child care as well as with the low availability of part time.
Finally, we run a policy experiment similar to Viitanen (2004) for the
UK and Wrohlich (2004) for Germany. Using our estimates, we simulate the
change in female employment when child care costs are partially or fully sub-
sidized. Viitanen (2004) reports an increase in the labor force participation
by 25.4 percentage points in case of a 100 percent subsidy of private child
care costs. Running a policy simulation of a hundred percent subsidy to child
care costs for Germany Wrohlich (2004) ﬁnds an increase in the participation
rate of mothers with preschool children of about 3.0 percentage points in the
west and about 1.5 in the east (starting from a labor force participation of
63% in east and 43% in west Germany). In our case, the same simulation
exercise run for the sample of women who are not rationed in the child care
market, i.e. those aﬀected by the change in child care costs, leads to an in-
crease in the participation rate of about 13 percentage points (see Table 7).
If the child care costs are subsidized only by 50%, the change in participation
would be of about 7%. Our result lies in between the two studies related to
Germany and the UK and is in line with what found by Connelly (1992)
who predicts for the US that if child care costs were subsidized 50%, 64% of
married women with young children would be employed (from the baseline
58.8) and if there were universal no-cost child care available 68.7% of women
12Notice that the hourly child care costs for Germany and the UK refer to children
below 5 years of age, while for Italy refer to children under three years. Since we know
that costs are higher for younger children, we expect that child care costs are even higher
the UK and Germany if only children below 3 are considered.
25would be employed.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we analyse the eﬀect of child care system characteristics on
women’s labour supply decisions. The availability of aﬀordable child care
has been identiﬁed by policy makers and social scientists in most countries
as one of the most important preconditions for high levels of married female
participation in the labor market.
The characteristics of the Italian child care system are peculiar. While the
quality of public child care is quite high in general, and fairly homogeneous
across regions, availability is both limited and heterogenous (with respect to
household characteristics such as income and area of residence). Child care,
although partially subsidized, lacks both local availability and ﬂexibility in
the hours of service. Therefore it is hardly compatible with the full time em-
ployment opportunities supplied in the Italian labor market. Child care costs
are subsidized to a diﬀerent extent depending on the municipality. To ana-
lyze the eﬀect of child care on mothers’ labor market participation decisions
in the Italian context we need to take into account the eﬀect of rationing of
services.
Our results indicate that labor force participation of women with chil-
dren is aﬀected by formal child care availability as well as the availability of
informal child care. The availability of family support, both in the form of
transfers and in the form of presence of parents respectively decreases and
increases the probability of market work of mothers. Child care costs are
signiﬁcant only in areas where child care is not severely rationed.
The empirical results seem to indicate that only policies which would
reduce the ﬁnancial burden on the Italian family and provide an expansion
of the child care system could have a large positive impact on the labour
market participation rate of mothers with young children.
26Table 1
Eﬀect of child care costs on mothers’ labor supply
Author Country Coeﬃcient
Connelly 1992 US negative and signiﬁcant
Ribar 1995 US negative and signiﬁcant
Viitanen 2004 UK negative and signiﬁcant
Powell 1997 Canada negative and signiﬁcant
Gustafsson and Staﬀord 1992 Sweden signiﬁcant only in areas not rationed
Del Boca 1993 Italy signiﬁcant only on part time
Wroolich 2004 Germany greater in West Germany
Kornstad and Thoresen 2004 Norway greater in non rationed areas
27Table 2
Simulated Probabilities with and without Rationing











Age of the Wife 32.2
(4.74)






Family non Labor Income 8.74
(in thousands Euro) (2.69)






Children aged 4-5 0.14
(0.35)
Children aged 6-13 0.44
(0.65)
Hourly Child Care Costs 1.45
(only those who pay) (2.03)
Part Time 8.31
(1.71)





Proportion of work and child care use in areas with more or less
rationing
NW=1 NW=0
work and child care .158 .117
work, no child care .458 .290
no work, use child care .074 .083
no work, no child care .310 .509
Child care availability 15% 3.5%
Children in waiting list 31.33 4 .5
30Table 5 Participation and Child Care Decision
Variables Participation Marg. eﬀects Child care Marg. eﬀects
Hourly Child Care Costs .418 .163 -.218 -.014
(.269) (.285)
NW .145 .057 .097 .028
(.129) (.130)
Age of wife .087** .034 .021 .006
.020 (.021)
Education of wife .108** .042 .027 .007
(.018) (.019)
Education of husband -.031∼ -.012 .036∼ .010
(.018) (.019)
Age of husband -.021* -.008 .002 .001
(.011) (.011)
Non labor Income -.005 -.002 .038 .010
(.027) (.029)
Husband labour income .009 .003 .003 .001
(.011) (.011)
Family Transfers -.389* -.145 .533** .167
(.200) (.206)
Parents Alive .584** .211 -.309∼ -.090
(.182) (.176)
Children aged 4-5 -.208∼ -.082 .312* .085
(.119) (.124)
Children aged 6-13 -.120∼ -.047 .086 .024
(.077) (.065)
part time .018 .007 -.015 -.004
(.030) (.033)






Correlation coeﬃcient (ρ) 0.244** (0.053)
31Table 6 Participation and Child Care Decision
Variables Participation Marg. eﬀects Child care Marg. eﬀects
Hourly child care costs predicted .459∼ .180 -.192 -.052
(.277) (.287)
NW 1.223** .450 .877∗ .291
(.435) (.427)
Hourly child care costs*NW -.564** -.221 -.408∗ -.111
(.217) (.212)
Age of wife .083** .033 .018 .005
(.022) (.021)
Education of wife .113** .044 .030∼ .008
(.018) (.018)
Education of husband -.028 -.011 .038∗ .010
(.018) (.018)
Age of husband -.020∼ -.008 .002 .001
(.011) (.011)
Non labor Income .002 .001 .042 .012
(.027) (.029)
Husband labor income .009 .003 .003 .001
(.011) (.011)
Transfers -.390∗ -.146 .536** .171
(.196) (.210)
Parents Alive .546** .198 -.334∼ -.101
(.185) (.187)
Children aged 4-5 -.206∼ -.081 .313* .086
(.117) (.126)
Children aged 6-13 -.115∼ -.045 .092 .025
(.083) (.074)
part time .014 .006 -.018 -.005
(.031) (.033)




Correlation coeﬃcient (ρ) 0.237** (0.053)
32Table 7
Labor supply simulations
Country Baseline 50% subsidy 100% subsidy
Our study Italy 61 +6.9% +13.2%
Viitanen (2004) UK 50.7 +13.8 +25%
Wrohlich (2004) Germany 43% west, 63% in east - +3% (west),1.5% (east)
Connelly (1992) US 58.8 +5.2% +9.9
338.1 Appendix 1- Statistical matching
The purpose of this section is to explain how the statistical matching was
performed.
First, we select married couples with both partners present. Next, we take
into consideration only women who are housewives, unemployed, students
or employed; in addition, they have to be married to men who are either
unemployed, retired or employed.13 This reduces the sample to 3140 couples
b e l o n g i n gt ot h eS H I Ws u r v e ya n dt o8 3 4 7f r o mt h eM u l t i s c o p os u r v e y .
In order to impute non labor household income, the total sample of 11487
households is used. When the labor earnings and hours of work from women
and men of the SHIW survey to women of the Multiscopo survey have to be
imputed, the statistical matching is realized respectively only on women who
work (1122 from the SHIW and 3039 from the Multiscopo) and on men who
work (2003 from the SHIW and 5669 from the Multiscopo) to further reduce
imprecision.
As a baseline analysis, we compare the averages for all of variables the two
surveys have in common. We compute descriptive statistics for women and
for men related to selected variables from the two surveys (members, number
of children in diﬀerent age groups, age, education, area of residence).14
The next step would be to match units from the two surveys, conditional
on the common variables X. However, when the vector of common variables
is large, this procedure is rather complicate. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)
suggest that matching can be performed on the propensity score, which is the
conditional probability of belonging to a sample, e.g. the Multiscopo sample.
In order to compute the propensity score, we have run a probit regression
of the binary indicator taking value 1 for observations in the Multiscopo
sample (and 0 for the SHIW sample) over the set of above-mentioned common
household characteristics plus some interaction terms.15 Since the propensity
score is a continuous variable, exact matches will rarely be achieved and a
13We exclude self-employed workers in order to have a more uniform sample for the
matching procedure, and retired women because they are not relevant to the problem at
hand (child care opportunities for very young children).
14Descriptive statistics and comparisons are available on request from the authors.
15The choice of interaction or higher order term to include for estimating the propensity
score is determined solely by the need to obtain an estimate of the propensity score that
satisﬁes the balancing property (see Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). To build the propensity
score we follow the algorithm proposed by Dehejia and Wahba (1998).
34certain distance between individuals belonging to the two samples has to be
allowed. Thus, we choose to use the radius method of matching;a m o n gt h e
units within the radius, we randomly select one unit, and we repeat this
procedure 20 times. The ﬁnal value of each imputed variables is obtained by
averaging the 20 values previously obtained.16 After the statistical matching
is performed, each individual from the Multiscopo will be imputed the annual
labor earnings, the annual hours of work and the household non labor income
of a similar individual from the SHIW according to the value of the function
of the propensity score.
Finally, we proceed with an internal evaluation of the statistical match-
ing in two steps. First, we compare the average values between the values
of the imputed variables after the matching and the corresponding average
values in the donor set, i.e. the SHIW sample; then we evaluate the preser-
vation of relations between variables. The results are quite satisfactory since
the imputed variables are not statistically diﬀerent from the original ones in
almost all the cases and the diﬀerences between the common-fusion correla-
tions in the SHIW data set versus the fused Multiscopo data set seem to be
well preserved for most variables (see Del Boca, Locatelli and Vuri 2005 for
details).
16The standard errors are computed by bootstrapping.
358.2 Appendix 2-
Table A.1
Child care availability, waiting list and Part time by Region
Regions CC-regional Children in the Part Time∗∗
distribution waiting list∗
Piemonte/Valle d’Aosta 8.7 38.9 7.65
Lombardia 17.3 31.4 8.97
Trentino 2.4 27.0 12.31
Friuli 2.3 39.8 11.19
Veneto 17.1 41.7 9.77
Liguria 2.8 56.7 7.87
Emilia 10.6 20.8 10.79
Toscana 6.4 35.7 9.21
Umbria 1.85 29.8 8.56
Marche 4.8 33.1 8.62
Lazio 7.95 37.5 7.47
Abruzzo-Molise 1.05 29.5 5.44
Campania 5.45 40.7 6.30
Puglia 2.9 29.0 6.37
Basilicata 0.9 27.2 6.42
Calabria 1.95 27.6 8.88
Sicilia 3.6 29.6 9.01
Sardegna 1.9 36.0 9.03
Sources : ISTAT : Annuario Statistico Italiano1999 − 2001;
Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali : I servizi educativi
per la prima infanzia,2002
∗In the public sector
∗∗Authors’ calculations from the Labor Force Survey 1998
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